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The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asian countries increased rapidly d uring the 1980s and 
1990s, and a vast literature has found a positive association between FDI inflows and growth for develo p-
ing countries, noting a series of threshold effects. Less attention has been paid in the literature to whether 
developing countries are competing or complementing each other in ongoing efforts to stimulate FDI in-
flows. In this paper we therefore study the causality between growth and FDI in a sample of five Asian 
countries and uncover the co-movements of FDI shares in the region using a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model. It emerges clearly that Granger causality exists from growth to FDI, and FDI flows are indeed 
strongly interrelated in the Asian region. Significant policy relevant differences among individual coun-
tries in our sample and the rest of Asia are also revealed. 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a defining feature of the world economy and 
globalization over the past couple of decades, and concerted efforts are pursued by 
many developing countries to promote increased FDI. However, FDI remains highly 
concentrated. This is so both with reference to developed countries and as regards flows 
to developing countries. The African continent is lagging behind Latin America and 
Asia, and FDI is particularly important in Asian countries where this foreign resource 
flow is the most important source of external financing, and growth in FDI has been 
substantial. 
 
Figure 1 shows three measures of the total inflow of foreign direct investment to Asia. 
There is a fairly constant rate of growth in nominal USD FDI-flows to Asia with an av-
erage annual growth rate of 19%.2 Moreover, the two constant price series in Figure 1, 
where nominal flows have been deflated with respectively a World price index and an 
East-Asian price index, also show a constant growth trend during the period 1970-2000. 
Average annual growth rates of respectively 8.6 and 10 % can be noted. Accordingly, 
FDI-flows to Asia have more than tripled during the period under study.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In most Asian countries, FDI inflows have also been substantial as measured in relation 
to the size of their economies. In this paper we focus on the following five countries: 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand. The stock of FDI to GDP in China 
(31%) is close to the average for all Asia, whereas Indonesia (46%), Malaysia (65%), 
and Vietnam (56%) have FDI/GDP ratios which far exceed both Asian and world stand-
ards. Thailand, on the other hand, has a relatively low FDI stock as a share of GDP. 
Thailand nevertheless ranks 12th among developing country recipients of total inward 
FDI stock. 
 
There is in the development literature a long and contentious debate about the costs and 
benefits of FDI inflows to recipient countries. On the one hand, evidence exists to con-
firm that given appropriate policies and a basic level of development, FDI can play a 
key role in triggering technology spillovers, assist human capital formation, contribute 
                                                 
2 There is no natural choice of deflator for FDI-flows to a region. We have therefore chosen to report two 
(approximate) measures of constant USD flows. In one we have deflated nominal values using the World 
average consumer price index and in the other we deflate by average East Asian consumer prices. Both 
series are from the WDI CD-ROM 2002. FDI measures (flows and stocks) are from the UNCTAD FDI 
data base available at http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm.  
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to international trade integration, and help create a better business environment. On the 
other hand, potential drawbacks include a deterioration of the balance of payments as 
profits are repatriated, lack of linkages with local communities, potential harmful envi-
ronmental consequences, social disruptions and negative impacts on competition in na-
tional markets. On balance, the consensus view on FDI seems to be that there is a posi-
tive association between FDI inflows and developing country growth provided receiv-
ing countries have reached a minimum level of educational, technological and/or infra-
structure development. There is however less clarity about causality, which is crucial for 
the formulation of economic policy.  
 
In this paper, we therefore study the short run causal pattern between economic growth 
and FDI in the five selected Asian countries. Based on panel data for the period 1970-
2000, we show that growth in general Granger-causes FDI, whereas the effects from 
FDI to growth are less apparent. This is a relatively robust result independent of estima-
tion method. While this might be interpreted as if FDI is not important to growth we 
stress that this would be an analytical step too far. Lack of short run causality from FDI 
to growth does not imply that FDI has no impact on long run growth. In fact, there are 
as already noted many reasons to suggest that a long run link between FDI and growth 
exists – at least under a set of specific country circumstances. 
 
The relatively strong association between FDI inflows and growth in combination with 
the evidence of short run causality from growth to FDI is one potential explanation why 
policymakers and economic advisers continue to emphasize the need for establishing an 
enabling environment for attracting FDI to individual countries. This also forms part of 
the justification for the central question in this paper, which is whether recipient coun-
tries are competing against each other or whether FDI flows to one country complement 
flows to neighbouring counterparts. This topic has at best received scant attention in the 
literature in spite of it being highly policy relevant. As a case in point, decision makers 
in Vietnam are keenly aware of the complex historical and economic relationships with 
China, and they clearly worry about whether Vietnam is loosing out when FDI flows 
find their way to China. 
 
A priori it is uncertain whether FDI to individual countries stimulates or crowds out in-
vestment to regional counterparts. A variety of spillover effects from FDI flows from 
one country to another are possible. It is equally correct that potential decisions about 
where to direct FDI flows are at times mutually exclusive. To provide empirical evi-
dence on this issue, we study the dynamic association between FDI-shares in the five 
selected countries within a vector autoregressive model.  
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Our results suggest that FDI inflows to the sample of Asian countries in focus are highly 
interdependent. Moreover, by way of illustration it emerges that an increase in China’s 
FDI share actually complements FDI inflows to Vietnam. In contrast, increased FDI to 
Thailand and Indonesia actually harm Vietnam in terms of relative FDI inflows. Based 
on this short term empirical regularity, Vietnam should be less concerned about FDI to 
China than to other countries in the region, and this is confirmed with reference to long 
run responses as well. 
 
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a brief literature review of the associa-
tion between FDI inflows and economic growth. In addition, we summarize our short 
run Granger-causality analysis using a variety of panel data estimation techniques. Sec-
tion 3 goes on to document co-movements of FDI-inflows during the period 1970-2000. 
Focus is on the statistical analysis of the shares of FDI inflows in Asia. Section 4 pro-
vides discussion and conclusions and offers a tentative explanation of some of the ob-
served regularities identified in the data. 
 
2. FDI and economic growth: an analysis of causality  
During the last decade a number of interesting studies of the role of foreign direct in-
vestment in stimulating economic growth has appeared. In an excellent survey, de 
Mello (1997) lists two main channels through which FDI may be growth enhancing. 
First, FDI can encourage the adoption of new technology in the production process 
through capital spillovers. Second, FDI may stimulate knowledge transfers, both in 
terms of labor training and skill acquisition and by introducing alternative management 
practices and better organizational arrangements. Another survey by OECD (2002) un-
derpins these observations and documents that FDI has contributed positively to income 
growth and factor productivity in 11 out of 14 studies reviewed.  
 
It is important to highlight, however, that both de Mello (1997) and OECD (2002) stress 
that one key insight from all the studies reviewed is that the way in which FDI affects 
growth is likely to depend on the economic and technological conditions of the host 
country. More specifically, it appears that developing countries have to reach a certain 
threshold of development, in education and/or infrastructure, before they are able to 
capture potential benefits associated with FDI. Hence, FDI tends to have more limited 
growth impact in technologically less advanced countries. 
 
Four studies, relying on a variety of cross-country regressions, have looked into neces-
sary conditions for identifying a positive impact of FDI on economic growth. Interest-
ingly, they stress different, but highly correlated, aspects of development. First, Blom-
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 




ström et al. (1994) argue that FDI has a positive growth-effect when the country is suf-
ficiently rich in terms of per capita income. Second, Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) 
stress that trade openness is crucial for acquiring the potential growth impact of FDI. 
Third, Borenztein et al. (1998) find that FDI raises growth, but only in countries where 
the labour force has achieved a minimum threshold of education. Finally, Alfaro et al. 
(2003) show that FDI promotes economic growth in economies with sufficiently devel-
oped financial markets. 
 
The three last studies all address possible endogeneity of FDI flows in the growth re-
gressions, and they find evidence of endogeneity in terms of significant changes in the 
parameter estimates. These three studies also take due note of the difficulty of finding 
good instruments for the FDI flows, which leads to the practice of including lagged val-
ues of FDI as the prime instrument in order to arrive at consistent parameter estimates 
of the impact of FDI on growth. However, in terms of policy advice it becomes difficult 
on this basis to formulate precise recommendations about the ways in which individual 
countries can attract FDI, apart from pointing to the usefulness of general growth en-
hancing policies. To illustrate, FDI is likely to flow to developing economies when their 
growth prospects make them relatively attractive to foreign investors. As a result, varia-
bles related to the growth dynamics of the recipient economy may well be strongly as-
sociated with FDI and hence stimulate larger inflows hereof. 
 
To clarify whether or not good growth prospects do attract FDI inflows, we focus in 
what follows on short run causality between economic growth and FDI in a panel data 
set for our sample of five Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam) during the period 1970-2000. FDI data were as already noted obtained from 
the UNCTAD FDI database, whereas real GDP and current GDP data come from World 
Development Indicators 2002.3  
 
Temporal causality between growth and FDI can be explored in several ways. Yet the 
most popular econometric analysis seems to be bi-variate Granger-causality tests. In this 
section we follow this line of analysis and look at a model for FDI and growth. It is 
however important to be aware of the limitations of this kind of analysis as discussed by 
Hamilton (1994) and references therein.  
 
In short, output growth is said to Granger-cause FDI inflows, when better predictions of 
FDI inflows are obtained when lagged values of output growth are included in the in-
formation set in addition to lagged values of FDI inflows. In more formal terms, the 
                                                 
3 The data series for China are only for the period 1980-2000. 
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causality between growth and FDI can be estimated using a VAR model for growth and 
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where 
itg and itFDI  is the rate of growth of output and FDI inflows in percent of GDP, 
respectively, in country i at time t. The letters, ,  , , and denote scalar parame-
ters, and n is the number of lags chosen so that 
itu and  it  are innovation processes. The 
null-hypotheses to be tested are that (i) FDI does not Granger cause economic growth in 
country i ( 0 1, , )   ij j n , and (ii) growth does not Granger cause FDI in country i 
( 0 1 , )   ij j n . If one of the null-hypotheses is rejected we loosely refer to this by 
stating respectively that FDI Granger causes growth or that growth Granger causes FDI.  
 
Possible non-stationarity of the time-series poses a problem in Granger-causality tests. 
We therefore tested for unit-roots. As the time-series are fairly short we made an effort 
to increase the precision of the unit-root tests by a rigid lag selection procedure and by 
using a small-sample correction of the unit-root tests. Thus, the tests for unit-roots were 
carried out by first selecting the appropriate lag for each series using three information 
criteria (AIC, SC, and HQ) and sequential F-tests. Subsequently, the null-hypothesis of 
a unit-root was tested using Johansen’s likelihood ratio test and applying the Bartlett-
correction given in Johansen (2002).  
 
The null-hypothesis for GDP growth was a unit-root without drift, while the alternative 
was mean stationarity. For FDI the null-hypothesis was a unit-root with drift against an 
alternative of trend-stationarity. Non-stationarity of the growth rates was rejected at 
conventional levels of significance for all countries. For FDI non-stationarity could not 
be rejected for China and Malaysia. However the hypothesis was rejected at conven-
tional levels of significance for the three other countries. Hence, the models for 
Granger-causality tests are formulated under the maintained assumption that growth 
rates are mean stationary and FDI inflows are trend stationary. 
 
Our panel has 28 observations in the time series dimension and five observations in the 
country dimension.4 Hence, the most general feasible panel data estimator in terms of 
slope parameters is Zellner’s SUR-estimator (Zellner, 1962). In the SUR model all pa-
rameters vary across countries, and cross-country interdependence is taken into account 
                                                 
4It is noted that we have only 19 observations for FDI and growth in China. 
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by the contemporaneous correlation between the error terms. Accordingly, we start by 
reporting the results of SUR-regressions of eq. (1) in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The assumption of auto-regression in growth is somewhat questionable as the regression 
results for three of the five countries in the upper half of Table 1 show that none of the 
slope parameters are statistically significant (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam). In fact, 
the tests for overall significance of the regressions lead to the conclusion that the model 
for China is the only one that in statistical terms outperforms predicting the growth rate 
by the constant mean. Obviously, the lack of statistical significance of any of the pa-
rameters may be due to lack of observations relative to the number of parameters in the 
SUR-model. However, it is important to keep in mind that when we conclude that FDI 
does not Granger cause growth in the short run, we could just as well state that growth 
itself has no predictive power for the subsequent growth rates. Turning to the specific 
tests for Granger causality, the causal directions are tested using Wald tests and there 
appears to be no causal relationship from FDI to growth in any of the selected countries.  
 
The autoregressive model for FDI appears to give a better fit compared to the growth 
equations, although the time trend is the only significant regressor in the equations for 
Thailand and Vietnam. Based on the results in the lower half of Table 1 we conclude 
that growth Granger-causes FDI inflows in Indonesia and Malaysia, but not in China, 
Thailand and Vietnam. However, for China we note that the first lag of growth is signif-
icant at the 10% level of significance.  
 
The SUR estimator is efficient given the assumption of homoskedastic innovations in 
each country. Given the recent history in the five Asian countries under study, there is 
reason to look closer at this assumption. We therefore tested for heteroskedasticity using 
the Breuch-Pagan test with the fitted values as regressors in the auxiliary regressions.5 
In the growth equations the hypothesis of homoskedasticity was rejected for Indonesia 
and Thailand, while it was rejected for Thailand and Vietnam in the FDI equations. 
 
In order to assess the effect of the possible heteroskedasticity on the regression results 
we re-estimated the model using OLS, equation by equation, with White’s heteroske-
dasticity robust standard errors. This estimator is consistent under heteroskedasticity, 
but less efficient under homoskedasticity compared to the SUR estimator. 
 
                                                 
5 The sample size makes White’s test for heteroskedasticity infeasible. 
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The results of the OLS regressions are given in Table 2, which shows that the change in 
estimator does not lead to qualitative changes in the results. We also find that FDI does 
not Granger cause growth in any of the countries, while growth Granger causes FDI in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and - with weaker support - China. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Imposing homogeneity of the slope parameters can increase the efficiency of the estima-
tors and hence lead to improved inference with respect to the Granger causality tests. In 
the first column of Table 3 we give results of constrained SUR regressions where all 
slope parameters () are restricted to be equal across equations while the inter-
cept and trend parameters are unrestricted. The cross-equation restrictions are easily ac-
cepted in the growth regressions (a p-value of 0.89), while they are marginally rejected 
in the FDI regressions (a p-value of 0.02). The results of the constrained SUR regres-
sion show that on average growth Granger causes FDI, while we maintain that FDI does 
not on average Granger cause growth. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
As for the SUR regressions in Table 1, we assess the impact of heteroskedasticity by 
OLS regressions with robust variance estimates. In the second column of Table 3 we re-
port results of an OLS regression in which the slope parameters are equal across coun-
tries, while the intercepts and trend parameters are unrestricted as in the SUR-regression 
in column 1. There are only minor changes in the parameter estimates in the growth 
equations, and general conclusions are the same. There are somewhat larger changes in 
the parameter estimates in the FDI equations,6 but the impact of growth is unchanged. 
In sum, we still find that growth Granger causes FDI. 
 
As we reject the hypothesis of equal slope parameters in the FDI equations it may be 
better to use a random coefficients model instead of the SUR and OLS models. We 
therefore report the results of a Swamy (1970) type random coefficients model in the 
third column of Table 3.7 The results are as expected in good accordance with the SUR 
and OLS results for the growth equations. It is more interesting to note that the point es-
timates in the random coefficients model are very close to those of the SUR regression 
for the FDI equations, although the lagged growth rates are statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
6 The lagged value of FDI is insignificant in the OLS regression, while it is significant in the SUR regres-
sion. 
7 It is important to note that the random coefficient estimators may not perform well in our sample as we 
only average over five countries. 
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This leads to the result that the hypothesis of no causal effect from growth to FDI is on-
ly marginally rejected at the 10% level of significance in the Swamy model. 
 
The Swamy model uses weighted averages of the country specific OLS parameter esti-
mates (see Swamy, 1970 and Hsiao, 1992 among others). Recently Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) have advocated for using simple averages of the OLS parameter estimates in dy-
namic heterogeneous panels (the mean group estimator, MGE). Asymptotically, the 
Swamy estimator and the MGE are equivalent, although the Swamy estimator is effi-
cient under the assumption of residual homoskedasticity. This means that the MGE of-
fers a simple way of assessing the impact of heteroskedasticity on the random coeffi-
cients results. In the fourth column of Table 3 we report the MGE results using robust 
variance estimates. Once again, there are only minor changes in the parameters in the 
growth equations and no change in the conclusion. In the FDI equations, the lagged 
growth rates become significant along with the second lag of FDI, where the latter result 
is driven by the large and highly significant parameter estimate for Indonesia. Based on 
the MGE we once more conclude that there is unidirectional causality from growth to 
FDI. 
 
The final regression we present in Table 3 is a two-way fixed effects regression. It is 
therefore qualitatively different from the ones discussed so far. In this regression we 
substitute the country specific time trends by common time dummies. This is a fre-
quently used way of eliminating contemporaneous correlations in the innovations. In 
terms of Granger causality the hypothesis is slightly changed compared to the models 
without time dummies. The alternative hypothesis in the two-way FE-regression is that 
lagged FDI inflows (growth) increase growth (FDI) when it is above the average in the 
country group. This is in contrast to the previous models in which FDI is measured rela-
tive to a country specific trend and growth is measured relative to a country specific 
mean. 
 
The final column in Table 3 shows that the change in model does lead to a qualitative 
change in conclusion. We find bidirectional Granger causal effects, i.e., in this model 
FDI Granger causes growth in addition to the already established causality from growth 
to FDI. Another interesting result of the two-way FE regression is that the impact of 
lagged growth in the growth equation is unchanged compared to the other regressions. It 
is only the impact of lagged FDI which changes. This indicates that the specification us-
ing a country specific detrending of FDI may be too simplistic a formulation. On the 
other hand, the result may also be due to over-parameterization in the two-way FE mod-
el. 
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Comparing our results with other studies of Granger causality between growth and FDI 
reveals good correspondence between our results and previous findings. The study with 
the closest resemblance to our work is Zhang (2001). He looks at annual data for 11 
countries on a country-by-country basis, dividing the countries according to the time se-
ries properties of the data. Zhang’s results are therefore comparable to our SUR, OLS, 
and Panel results, but not with our two-way FE regression. Zhang finds unidirectional 
causation from growth to FDI in Malaysia and Thailand and bidirectional causation in 
Indonesia.8 Turning to de Mello (1999), he looks at causation from FDI to growth in 32 
countries of which 17 are non-OECD countries. In the sample of non-OECD countries 
he finds no causation from FDI to growth based on one-way FE regressions and the 
mean group estimator. Finally, Choe (2003) analyzes 80 countries aggregating over 
time to five year averages. In his GMM regressions he includes time dummies. His re-
sults are therefore comparable to those of our two-way FE method, and conclusions are 
similar as Choe finds bidirectional causality between growth and FDI. 
 
We conclude that the causal link from growth to FDI is quite robust while the finding of 
a causal link from FDI to growth is highly dependent on model specification. This is not 
surprising given the cross-country growth regression results surveyed in the beginning 
of this section. If threshold externalities play an important role for the impact of FDI on 
growth we should not expect to find causal links in a linear model. Moreover, as the 
impact of FDI on growth is likely to take time to materialize, this effect is hard to iden-
tify in annual data where business cycle fluctuations dominate. We reiterate that our re-
sults should not be interpreted as supporting that FDI has no impact on long run growth. 
Instead, we wish to stress the clear short run causality from growth to FDI in our data. 
This finding is highly policy relevant. It shows that growth stimulating policies trigger 
increased inflows of FDI in the short run, and this may in turn underpin higher long run 
growth. In sum, establishing a good growth enabling environment appears an important 
priority in stimulating FDI.  
 
In spite of this general policy recommendation, it is unclear what happens to FDI flows 
to individual countries if all countries in a region engage in growth and FDI stimulating 
policies. Tax competition among countries in the OECD is a much discussed topic. In 
contrast, competition for FDI inflows across borders among developing countries has 
not attracted much attention, and it is a priori not evident whether FDI to individual 
countries stimulates or crowds out investment to regional counterparts. One can easily 
think of forces generating both results. In the next section we therefore focus on wheth-
                                                 
8 For Indonesia the result is based on an error-correction model, as Zhang finds cointegration between the 
log of FDI and the log of income in Indonesia. 
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er FDI inflows to one country complement or substitute FDI to other countries in the re-
gion. 
 
3. Co-movements of FDI-inflows  
The most common perception of FDI inflows to different countries is undoubtedly that 
such flows are substitutes rather than complements. However, in developing areas it is 
clearly possible that FDI-inflows to one country generate increased inflows to neigh-
bouring countries. One may think of foreign investors looking at regions as competing 
while individual countries within regions complement each other because of knowledge 
spillover and other economies of scale. In this section, we take a first look at the issue of 
substitution versus complementarity in FDI among the five selected Asian countries. 
From the outset we wish to stress that our analysis is data-driven and should be inter-
preted as an attempt to shed light on existing regularities, which might stimulate further 
theoretical and analytical work. 
 
In Figure II we have shown the pattern of FDI-shares within Asia. We have computed 
the shares of FDI-flows to the five countries of interest, while the rest of the Asian 
countries are grouped together under the label ‘Rest of Asia’ (RoA). The specific selec-
tion of countries rests on two premises. First, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore were 
excluded in advance, as these countries are markedly different from other countries in 
the region.9 Second, we conducted a pre-testing exercise to identify a set of countries 
with sizable FDI-shares, which at the same time influence each other.10 The most inter-
esting result of the pre-testing is that FDI inflows to the Republic of Korea do not seem 
to be of importance for flows to the group of countries under study here and vice versa. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Measured by average shares of total FDI-inflows to Asia, China is by far the largest re-
cipient in the region with an average share of 20.7% during the period 1970-2001.11 
Malaysia ranks second (15.2%), while Indonesia and Thailand are in third and fourth 
place with 7.4% and 5.5%, respectively. Finally, Vietnam is the smallest recipient in the 
group with an average share below one percent.  
 
                                                 
9 The average share of FDI-inflows over the period 1970-2001 is about 17 percent to each of Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Hence in terms of volume of the flows Hong Kong and Singapore are certainly  interest-
ing. 
10 We used PcGets to obtain parsimonious equations for the FDI share in each country, see Hendry and 
Krolzig (2001). 
11 This is so in spite of non-existent inflows prior to 1979. 
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Looking closer at the time paths of FDI shares, we note that on average Malaysia and 
Indonesia were the largest recipients in the 1970s. Relative FDI-inflows were highly 
volatile in that period and there appears to be quite a strong negative co-movement be-
tween the inflows to Malaysia and Indonesia. From 1980 and onwards China enters the 
stage, and during only five years the Chinese share climbed from zero to almost 40% of 
total inflows to Asia. Moreover, during the 1990s the Chinese share increased to around 
60% in some years. 
 
This significant change in the levels of the relative shares of FDI-inflows makes it diffi-
cult to establish a precise notion of positive and negative co-movements. Nevertheless, 
from Figure II it appears as if Malaysia did not loose much ground when China entered. 
Indeed, from 1985 and onwards China and Malaysia appear to move together. It is hard 
to tell if the changes in the FDI-shares to China and Malaysia are at the expense of the 
three other countries in our group or at the expense of the rest of the countries in Asia. 
Therefore we turn to a more formal statistical analysis of the FDI-shares focusing on the 
degree of competition. 
 
We hold no prior beliefs about who are leaders and followers among the Asian coun-
tries in terms of FDI-inflows, and we are unaware of any literature on this issue. We 
therefore concentrate on the dynamic relationships among FDI-shares using a vector au-
toregressive (VAR) model. It is noted that the FDI-shares for China, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Thailand and Vietnam and RoA sum to 100% by construction. Thus, we can con-
centrate on the five selected countries in the analysis and leave the impact on and from 
RoA to be given implicitly. Accordingly, in what follows we do not derive all the pa-
rameters for RoA although this could be done in a straightforward manner. In order to 
increase the readability of the regression results we have multiplied Vietnam’s FDI-
share by ten such that Vietnam’s share is measured per thousand instead of per cent. 
This scaling has of course no bearing on the results apart from the readability of the ta-
bles. 
 
China had as already noted no FDI-inflows prior to 1980. Strictly speaking, this con-
stancy of the flows violates some of the basic assumptions underlying the vector auto-
regressive model. We have corrected for this problem in a crude way, including a dum-
my variable for the period 1970-79.12 We estimated a second order VAR-model and ap-
                                                 
12 This ‘correction’ was the preferred choice among more sophisticated alternatives because of its relative 
simplicity.  
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plied the standard set of diagnostic tests (residual autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, 
and normality). The model passed all tests.13 
 
Figure II shows that the shares of FDI-inflows do not have constant means. It is there-
fore of interest to test whether the shares are non-stationary, and whether they cointe-
grate. We do not interpret the presence of cointegration vectors as steady state relation-
ships as such. It is more intuitive to think of them as a way of testing whether there are 
significant low-frequency co-movements among the FDI-shares. If the shares are sta-
tionary the low-frequency co-movements are all zero since the shares return at some 
point to their constant means. At the other extreme, if there is no cointegration, the low-
frequency co-movements will all be non-zero. Finally, the presence of cointegration al-
lows for both zero and non-zero low-frequency movements. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of our cointegration analysis. There is strong empirical evi-
dence against the hypothesis that the shares are not cointegrating at all. It is more diffi-
cult to tell from the data whether there are one or two cointegration relationships. For 
the sake of simplicity we have chosen to follow a strict testing scheme and reject the 
hypothesis of more than one cointegration relationship at the 5% level of significance. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The five countries of interest have all changed policies towards FDI during the period 
under study. Consequently, we have looked into the question of structural breaks in the 
VAR model. As we have no a priori information about a specific year for which a pos-
sible break should occur for the group of countries, we rely on the fluctuation test of the 
eigenvalues proposed by Hansen and Johansen (1999). With fixed short run parameters 
we obtain a fluctuation statistic of 0.73. The critical value of the test is 1.63 (at the 5% 
level of significance). On this basis, we can conclude that the parameters of the cointe-
gration space are constant over time. 
 
The estimated cointegration relation is reported on the right-hand side of Table 4. The 
structure of the cointegration relationship is surprisingly simple. China and Malaysia 
both have weights equal to one whereas Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have weights 
equal to minus one. The implication is that when low frequency co-movements are stud-
ied, the five countries separate into two groups of positive and negative weights. 
  
                                                 
13 The assumption of normality of the residuals is only accepted at marginal levels as the multivariate test 
has a p-value of 2.3%. All results are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 5 presents the estimated parameters of the error-correction model for the FDI-
shares. The dependent variables are the year-to-year changes in the shares while the ex-
planatory variables are the lagged changes in the shares and the restricted cointegration 
vector given in Table 4. In Table 5, we report Nyblom tests of parameter instability in 
addition to the point estimates and their t-values, and there is no indication of parameter 
instability. Hence, using the Nyblom test we find no support for suggesting that changes 
in policies towards FDI inflows in Asian countries make the parameter estimates unsta-
ble. 
 
The main results in Table 5 are that China, Malaysia, and Thailand, in addition to hav-
ing significant responses to own lagged changes in FDI shares, all respond to at least 
two other countries in the group and to the error-correction term. Thus, these three 
countries appear to be highly dependent on FDI-flows to neighbouring countries. More-
over, while Malaysia and Thailand seem to loose shares to other countries in the sam-
ple, China gains whenever Thailand or Vietnam increase their share. Indonesia is at the 
other extreme. Only a weak response to changes in Malaysia can be identified apart 
from the significant error correction. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Vietnam is interesting in the present context for three reasons. First, while it appears as 
if Vietnam looses shares to China in the short run, there is no significant impact of this 
kind from any of the other countries. In contrast, when the share of FDI-flows to Vi-
etnam increases, there is a significant gain in China and significant losses in Malaysia 
and Thailand. Finally, Vietnam is the only country for which we do not record a signifi-
cant impact from the low-frequency co-movements represented by the error-correction 
term. It therefore seems as if Vietnam is relatively unaffected in the short run by the 
group of countries under study as a whole. 
 
The complete set of dynamic responses to changes in the FDI-shares in the individual 
countries is difficult to visualize from the error-correction representation of the model. 
We therefore estimate the reduced form impulse-response functions of the VAR model. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The estimated moving average parameters are given in Table 6. For each of the coun-
tries, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand we look at an initial change in the FDI-
share of one percentage point and measure the responses in percent. For Vietnam, we 
use an initial change of 0.1 percentage point and measure the responses as per thousand. 
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Because of the adding-up constraint on the shares, we are implicitly looking at the effect 
of a change in the FDI-flows from RoA to each of the countries in the model. The re-
sponse parameters in Table 6 are ordered such that the rows record the responses in 
each of the countries to the five initial shocks, while the columns reflect their impact. 
The responses are given for both short and long run time horizons.14 Asterisks in the ta-
ble indicate the precision of the estimated responses. Two asterisks denote that the re-
sponse is more than two standard errors away from zero, while one asterisk denotes that 
the response is more than one standard error away from zero. This corresponds roughly 
to 95% and 64% confidence bands. 
 
In the very short run China responds strongly to a change in its own share. One year af-
ter the initial shock, the FDI share remains around one percentage point higher. Moreo-
ver, in the long run an initial change of one percentage point leaves a lasting increase in 
China’s share of FDI of about one-half of a percentage point. The results for China are 
also of interest because it appears that China gains from increases in the FDI shares in 
all of the other four countries except Malaysia. For example, a one percentage point in-
crease in Thailand’s share leads to a one percentage point increase in China’s share of 
FDI one year after the initial change. This positive response increases slightly in the 
second and third year, whereas the permanent long run impact is an increase in China’s 
share of around 0.6 percentage point. This is in fact more than Thailand’s own perma-
nent increase. China’s response to a change in Vietnam’s share is also large and positive 
although the response seems to dampen at a somewhat faster rate as compared to a 
shock to Thailand. Yet, also in the case of Vietnam, the permanent change in China’s 
share of FDI greatly exceeds Vietnam’s own permanent response. A similar picture 
emerges in relation to Indonesia, so Malaysia is the only country for which an initial 
change in the share of FDI does not lead to a permanent increase in China’s share of 
FDI. However, this result is in fact not significant, so the overall impression is convinc-
ing. FDI to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam complements FDI to China. 
 
Malaysia comes out as an opposite case compared to China. This is so since Malaysia 
seems to loose FDI-shares whenever one of the other countries in the group experiences 
a positive shock. Moreover, the losses are quite substantial. This result holds true for all 
countries in terms of permanent changes, and in the short run Thailand is the only ex-
ception. Malaysia clearly comes across as a country which is competing for FDI with 
the other countries in the group. 
 
                                                 
14 By long run we mean the infinite time horizon and short run impacts are recorded for one, two and 
three year periods. 
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Results for Indonesia and Thailand are in some sense ‘in-between’ those for China and 
Malaysia. Indonesia and Thailand gain from shocks to some countries while they loose 
from shocks to other countries, and they do not compete or complement on a bilateral 
basis. One notable difference between Indonesia and Thailand is that Indonesia seems to 
get a permanent gain in FDI-share after positive shocks to China and Malaysia, while 
Thailand seems to experience a permanent loss from such shocks. However, the perma-
nent response in Thailand’s FDI-share following a shock to Malaysia is not well deter-
mined. 
 
Vietnam stands out as the country in our sample with the smallest gains and losses from 
changes in FDI-shares elsewhere even after correcting for the relatively small size of the 
Vietnamese economy. In the very short run (one year after the initial shock) all respons-
es are small and rather imprecisely determined, except for the response to a shock to 
Malaysia, which seems to have a positive and strong impact on Vietnam. The perma-
nent responses to shocks to the other countries in the group are small and statistically 
insignificant, again with the exception a shock to Malaysia. Moreover, the permanent 
response to an initial shock to Vietnam’s own FDI-share is small compared to the per-
manent own responses in the other countries.15 Finally, while it is a widely held belief 
that Vietnam is competing with China in terms of FDI-flows, this hypothesis is not con-
firmed by the present study in the long run. The point estimate of Vietnam’s response to 
a shock to China appears negative in the very short run, but the permanent response is 
close to nil and highly insignificant. Hence, there is an interesting asymmetry between 
Vietnam and China in the long run. China seems to gain from increasing in FDI-shares 
to Vietnam, whereas Vietnam is unaffected by increasing FDI-shares to China. Alt-
hough a ‘bandwagon’ effect (such as the China-Indonesia result) would be the ideal sit-
uation for Vietnam, things could be much worse involving asymmetric substitution ef-
fects such as in the China-Malaysia relationship. 
 
In order to complete the analysis of FDI-shares, it is of interest to look at the permanent 
changes in the FDI-shares between the selected group of countries, on the one hand, and 
RoA, on the other. All experiments use as the initial shock a reallocation of FDI-shares 
from RoA to each of the countries in the group, but over time a fraction of the initial re-
allocation of FDI may return to RoA. In the last row of Table 6 we report the estimated 
permanent responses in the FDI-share to RoA. It appears that there is a marked differ-
ence in the permanent change in RoA’s FDI-share. Because of the losses in Malaysia 
and Thailand following an initial change in China’s share the permanent drop in the 
share of RoA is below one-half. In contrast, reallocations to Malaysia, Indonesia or 
                                                 
15 Compare the point estimate of 0.4 to the other point estimates in the diagonal of the  long-run responses, 
which are all above 0.5. 
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Thailand lead to permanent losses in the FDI-share in RoA close to the initial one per-
cent shock. Finally, an initial reallocation towards Vietnam leads to the smallest perma-
nent loss in the FDI-share in RoA. More than 70% of the initial change returns to RoA 
in the long run. Viewed from this angle, Vietnam is not a strong contestant for FDI with 
respect to the rest of Asia as a group. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Foreign direct investment is widely perceived as an important growth catalyst, and the 
academic literature has generally found a positive association between FDI inflows and 
growth, noting that threshold effects are crucially important. In parallel, economic poli-
cies in developing countries have become increasingly focused on attracting FDI flows. 
Interestingly, based on existing literature it is far from clear whether developing coun-
tries are in reality competing or complementing each other in this effort.  
 
In our attempt at studying this topic, we put as a first step focus on the causal relation-
ships between FDI and economic growth in a sample of five Asian countries using a va-
riety of estimation techniques. It emerged quite convincingly that economic growth 
Granger-causes FDI. On the other hand, causality from FDI to growth is much less ap-
parent in our sample of countries. This finding should not be used to suggest that FDI 
has no impact on long run growth. Instead, our results underpin that policymakers and 
economic advisers would be well advised to pursue an enabling growth enhancing eco-
nomic environment. This is an effective way to help stimulate FDI flows. 
 
Having established that countries are able to attract FDI through growth, it comes as no 
surprise why policymakers do indeed devote so much attention to FDI flows. On this 
background, we found it meaningful to ask in more specific terms whether FDI to indi-
vidual countries stimulates or crowds out investment to regional counterparts. Thus, we 
were motivated to move on to the second step of our analysis, where we concentrated on 
the dynamic association between FDI-shares, relying on a vector autoregressive model.  
 
The results from this enquiry into the data inter alia show the following country specific 
features: 
 
 China generally benefits both in the short and long run from increased FDI 
shares to other countries in our sample, the exception being Malaysia. The posi-
tion of China is clearly very favourable and the Chinese government need not be 
concerned about FDI competition from Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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 In contrast to China, Malaysia generally competes with all the other countries in 
our group in both the short and long run. Malaysia would be justified in worry-
ing about the sustainability of incoming FDI if other countries manage to ad-
vance in this area. 
 Indonesia and Thailand are more mixed when it comes to FDI. They sometimes 
compete and they sometimes complement regional counterparts when it comes 
to the share of FDI flows. 
 Vietnam is justified in being preoccupied with FDI to China, but only in the very 
short term. In the medium and long run there is no impact on the share of FDI to 
Vietnam when the share of China increases. Instead it appears Vietnam should 
in the long run be more concerned about the relationship to Indonesia and Thai-
land.  
 
In sum, our results clearly document that FDI inflows to the Asian countries are highly 
interdependent. On a bilateral basis, the five selected countries in our sample either 
compete or complement each other in most cases. Altogether, this should certainly be 
taken into account by policymakers when identifying and designing appropriate strate-
gies for attracting FDI. In this process, account should of course be taken of the more 
specific characteristics of the distribution of FDI by sector and country of origin for the 
individual countries in our sample. 
 
Developing further insights into the specifics of FDI flows would go beyond the scope 
of the present paper. However, as a tentative illustration of the critical importance here-
of, we include in Annex 1 two summary tables. On this basis, we can conclude that on 
average almost 60% of inward FDI to China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam originate 
from no more than three sources. In the case of Indonesia this share is 33%. Similarly, 
FDI is generally highly concentrated in only a few sectors. These patterns no doubt can 
help explain the above general findings about the interrelationship of FDI flows.  
 
For example, the strong negative co-movement between Malaysia and Indonesia is in all 
likelihood closely related to the fact that two out of the three most important FDI sectors 
are common and in addition they share Japan as a key source of FDI. Similarly, the 
negative long run relationship Thailand and Malaysia certainly appears closely related 
to overlap between FDI origin (USA and Japan) and sector focus (Electronics). Finally, 
the fact that Vietnam is at present relatively secluded is no doubt caused by the signifi-
cant and in regional terms unique share of FDI going into the oil and gas sector (59%). 
 
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 






Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Sayek, S. (2003). “FDI and economic 
growth: The role of local financial markets”, Journal of International Econom-
ics, forthcoming. 
Balasubramanyam, V.N., Salisu, M. and Sapsford, D. (1996). “Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Growth in EP and IS Countries”, Economic Journal, 106, 92-105. 
Blomström, M., Lipsey, R.E. and Zejan, M. (1994). “What explains developing country 
growth”, NBER Working Paper No. 4132. 
Borenztein, E., De Gregorio, J. and Lee, J.-W. (1998). ”How does foreign direct in-
vestment affect economic growth”, Journal of International Economics, 45, 
115-135. 
Choe, J.I. (2003). “Do foreign direct investment and gross domestic investment promote 
economic growth?”, Review of Development Economics, 7, 44-57.  
de Mello, L.R. (1997). “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and 
Growth: A Selective Survey”, Journal of Development Studies, 34, 1-34. 
de Mello, L.R. (1999). “Foreign direct investment-led growth: Evidence from time se-
ries and panel data”, Oxford Economic Papers, 51, 133-151. 
Hamilton, J.D. (1994). “Time Series Analysis”, Princeton University Press.  
Hansen, B.E. (1992). “Testing for Parameter Instability in Linear Models”, Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 14, 517-533. 
Hansen, H. and Johansen, S. (1999). “Some Tests for Parameter Constancy in Cointe-
grated VAR-models”, Econometrics Journal, 2, 306-333. 
Hendry, D.F. and Krolzig, H. M. (2001). Automatic Econometric Model Selection with 
PcGets, London: Timberlake Consultants Press. 
Hsiao, C. (1992). “Random Coefficients Models”. In Mátyás, L. and Sevestre, P. (eds.) 
The Econometrics of Panel Data (Chapter 5), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Johansen, S. (2002). “A Small Sample Correction for the Test of Cointegration Rank in 
the Vector Autoregressive Model”, Econometrica, 70, 1929-1961. 
OECD (2002). “Foreign direct investment for development: Maximising benefits, min-
imizing costs”, OECD publishing, Paris. 
Pesaran, M.H. and Smith, R. (1995). “Estimating Long-run Relationships from Dynam-
ic Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 79-113. 
Reinsel, G.C. and Ahn, S.K. (1992). “Vector Autoregressive Models with Unit Roots 
and Reduced Rank Structure: Estimation, Likelihood Ratio Test, and Forecast-
ing”. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 13, 353-375. 
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 




Swamy, P.A.V.B (1970). “Efficient Inference in a Random Coefficient Regression 
Model”, Econometrica, 38, 311-323. 
Zhang, K.H. (2001). “Does foreign direct investment promote economic growth? Evi-
dence from East Asia and Latin America”, Contemporary Economic Policy, 19, 
175-185. 
Zellner, A. (1962). “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regres-
sions and Tests of Aggregation Bias”, Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation, 57, 500-509. 
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 







Table A1: Distribution of FDI inflows by sector 
 Vietnam* China* Indonesia* Thailand* Malaysia 
Agriculture 5,82 2,17 2,89 0,42 NA 
Industry 56,20 65,04 72,37 42,09 NA 
Construction 8,27 2,66 0,99 5,94 NA 
Transp. and communication  5,82 1,60 4,19 5,02 NA 
Real estate 17,28 20,55 5,36 22,35 NA 
Services 6,62 7,98 14,20 24,18 NA 
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Source: Nguyen (2000), Doanh (2002), Wei & Lui (2001), Azis (1998), Brooker Group (2002), Internet Portal 
www.info.tdri.or.th and Internet portal www.bkpm.go.id 
*Notes: Vietnam: Data from 1988-2000. Includes investment of domestic joint venture partners. Excludes FDI in 
oil and gas. China: Data from 1987-1998, contractual data. Indonesia: Data from 1990-2000. Excludes 
FDI in oil and gas, banking and insurance. Thailand: Data from 1988-2000. 
 
Table A2: Distribution of FDI inflows by sector and originating country 
 Top three sectors (%  of total) 
Vietnam Oil and Gas (59%) Light industry (18%) Heavy industry (9%) 
China Manufacturing (46%) Real estate (16%) Utilities (6%) 
Indonesia Chemicals and pharmacy (30%) Paper, printing and publ. (11%) Electronics (10%) 
Thailand Trade (25%) Machinery and transport (11%) Electronics (10%) 
Malaysia Electronics (51%) Paper, printing and publ. (9%) Non-metallic mineral prod. (8%) 
 Top three originating countries (%  of total) 
Vietnam UK (30%) India (25%) Chinese Taipei (15%) 
China Hong Kong (41%) USA (10%) Virgin Islands (9%) 
Indonesia Japan (16%) UK (9%) Singapore (8%) 
Thailand Japan (27%) USA (17%) Singapore (13%) 
Malaysia USA (28%) Japan (16%) Netherlands (11%) 
Source: OECD (2002) 
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Table 1: SUR estimates of the VAR for growth and FDI 
Dependent variable: Growth in GDP 
Country   China Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam 
Growth Lag 1 0.696** 0.239 0.181 0.420** 0.201 
  (3.12) (1.29) (1.06) (2.26) (1.19) 
 Lag 2 -0.557** -0.019 -0.206 -0.128 -0.256 
  (2.42) (0.10) (1.20) (0.67) (1.52) 
FDI Lag 1 0.339 -0.001 0.216 0.689 0.252 
  (0.76) (0.00) (0.46) (0.78) (0.87) 
 Lag 2 0.132 -1.175 0.079 -0.228 0.035 
  (0.32) (1.23) (0.18) (0.25) (0.12) 
Trend  -0.196 -0.126 -0.092 -0.160 0.165 
  (1.01) (1.11) (0.76) (1.33) (1.11) 
Constant  11.57** 7.816** 7.384** 6.706** 2.232 
    (2.58) (2.61) (2.86) (2.87) (1.01) 
R2  0.53 0.26 0.09 0.32 0.27 
Granger (p-values) 0.68 0.36 0.73 0.74 0.68 
       
Dependent variable: FDI 
Country   China Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam 
Growth Lag 1 0.232* 0.101** 0.105 -0.015 0.064 
  (1.89) (3.35) (1.52) (0.34) (0.56) 
 Lag 2 -0.077 0.021 0.140** 0.019 0.060 
  (0.61) (0.63) (2.00) (0.43) (0.52) 
FDI Lag 1 0.234 0.448** 0.523** 0.271 -0.079 
  (0.94) (2.36) (2.31) (1.27) (0.42) 
 Lag 2 -0.251 0.422** -0.207 0.012 0.136 
  (1.10) (2.30) (1.04) (0.05) (0.71) 
Trend  0.284** 0.046** 0.099** 0.061** 0.230** 
  (2.66) (2.80) (2.28) (2.33) (2.38) 
Constant  -5.071** -0.862* -0.278 -0.089 -2.427* 
    (2.05) (1.88) (0.32) (0.18) (1.66) 
R2  0.69 0.70 0.70 0.48 0.43 
Granger (p-values) 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.90 0.73 
Observations 19 28 28 28 28 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%. 
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the VAR for growth and FDI 
Dependent variable: Growth in GDP 
Country   China Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam 
Growth Lag 1 0.718** 0.186 0.161 0.634** 0.049 
  (4.73) (1.10) (0.68) (2.04) (0.17) 
 Lag 2 -0.567** -0.024 -0.262 -0.138 -0.410* 
  (2.37) (0.12) (1.38) (0.68) (1.67) 
FDI Lag 1 0.341 0.157 0.215 0.965 0.217 
  (1.08) (0.12) (0.21) (1.02) (1.03) 
 Lag 2 0.149 -1.853 0.243 0.097 0.144 
  (0.65) (0.91) (0.30) (0.11) (0.62) 
Trend  -0.220* -0.120 -0.122 -0.177 0.209 
  (1.72) (1.20) (0.67) (1.16) (1.35) 
Constant  12.180** 8.645** 7.836** 5.111** 2.815 
    (4.06) (2.86) (2.24) (2.68) (0.78) 
R2  0.53 0.27 0.09 0.36 0.31 
Granger (p-values) 0.51 0.66 0.62 0.57 0.57 
       
Dependent variable: FDI 
Country   China Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam 
Growth Lag 1 0.264** 0.104** 0.097 -0.029 0.050 
  (2.07) (6.71) (1.21) (0.51) (0.98) 
 Lag 2 -0.086 0.030 0.128** 0.007 0.042 
  (1.11) (0.99) (2.65) (0.15) (0.84) 
FDI Lag 1 0.200 0.461** 0.616** 0.264 0.065 
  (0.56) (2.50) (2.23) (0.90) (0.20) 
 Lag 2 -0.248 -0.496** -0.211 -0.086 0.129 
  (0.79) (2.75) (0.99) (0.36) (0.65) 
Trend  0.316** 0.050** 0.084** 0.065** 0.199** 
  (2.42) (3.55) (2.03) (2.26) (2.79) 
Constant  -6.246** -1.007 -0.383 0.066 -2.229** 
    (2.10) (2.81) (0.36) (0.23) (2.31) 
R2  0.69 0.70 0.70 0.49 0.44 
Granger (p-values) 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.88 0.57 
Observations 19 28 28 28 28 
Notes: Robust t-values in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%. 
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Table 3: Panel estimates of the VAR for growth and FDI 









Two way FE 
(Robust) 
Dependent variable: Growth in GDP 
Growth Lag 1 0.331** 0.301** 0.349** 0.350** 0.348** 
  (3.41) (2.74) (2.31) (3.67) (3.42) 
 Lag 2 -0.186* -0.218** -0.222* -0.280** -0.160* 
  (1.91) (2.40) (1.88) (3.32) (1.68) 
FDI Lag 1 0.174 0.142 0.336 0.379 0.447** 
  (0.98) (0.86) (1.50) (1.12) (2.78) 
 Lag 2 -0.122 0.043 -0.103 -0.244 0.033 
  (0.68) (0.27) (0.23) (0.58) (0.17) 
Granger (p-values) 0.56 0.67 0.29 0.50 0.02 
       
Dependent variable: FDI 
Growth Lag 1 0.080** 0.077** 0.084 0.097** 0.096** 
  (4.69) (2.90) (1.61) (3.36) (2.48) 
 Lag 2 0.021 0.037* 0.037 0.024 0.029 
  (1.14) (1.67) (0.82) (1.19) (1.06) 
FDI Lag 1 0.319** 0.235 0.394** 0.321** 0.242 
  (3.28) (1.21) (2.97) (2.82) (1.46) 
 Lag 2 -0.008 0.053 -0.129 -0.182** 0.090 
  (0.08) (0.42) (1.01) (2.02) (0.64) 
Granger (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. (The t-values are robust when indicated in the heading). 
 * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%. 
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Table 4: FDI-shares in five Asian countries: cointegration results  
Rank test statistics  Estimated cointegration vectors  
Rank Eigenvalues Trace testa p-value     Unrestricted Restrictedb 
0 0.806 79.12 0.01  China 1 1 
1 0.682 47.95 0.05  Malaysia 0.93 1 
2 0.638 26.21 0.13  Indonesia -0.83 -1 
3 0.214 6.93 0.59  Thailand -1.14 -1 
4 0.116 2.35 0.13   Vietnam -1.01 -1 
Notes: aThe trace test statistic is calculated using a degrees of freedom correction (see Reinsel and Ahn, 
1992). bLR-test of restriction on the cointegration vector: 2(4) = 0.15. The p-value is above 0.99 
 
Table 5: Error correction models for the percentage shares of FDI-flows to five Asian 
countries, 1972-2000 
  China Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Vietnam 
Lagged changes of      








































































R2 0.78 0.58 0.46 0.43 0.54 
Std. Error 6.12 4.83 5.97 2.82 8.32 
Joint instability test 1.88 1.57 1.66 1.62 1.75 
Notes: The dependent variables are the year-to-year changes in the FDI-shares to the five countries . Absolute 
t-values in parentheses. Nyblom-statistics in brackets. Critical values for the Nyblom test of the individual pa-
rameters are 0.35 (10%) and 0.47 (5%). Critical values for the joint instability tests are 1.89 (10%) and 2.11 
(5%) (see Hansen, 1992). * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%. 
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Table 6: Estimated moving average parameters 
  Shock to 
Horizon Response in China Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Vietnam 
1. Year China 1.016** -0.254 0.058 1.079* 1.141** 
   (0.195)   (0.273)   (0.229)   (0.543)   (0.161)  
 Malaysia -0.460** 0.350* -0.338* 0.077 -0.294** 
   (0.153)   (0.215)   (0.180)   (0.427)   (0.127)  
 Indonesia -0.015 0.272* 0.320* -0.101 -0.043 
   (0.156)   (0.220)   (0.184)   (0.436)   (0.129)  
 Thailand -0.083* -0.208** -0.052 -0.247* 0.006 
   (0.074)   (0.103)   (0.087)   (0.205)   (0.061)  
 Vietnam -0.253* 1.020** 0.494* 1.151* -0.328* 
     (0.236)   (0.332)   (0.278)   (0.659)   (0.196)  
2. Year China 0.237 0.853* 0.737* 1.553* 0.388* 
   (0.426)   (0.559)   (0.486)   (1.078)   (0.309)  
 Malaysia -0.216* 0.275* 0.247* 0.579* -0.192* 
   (0.198)   (0.273)   (0.246)   (0.550)   (0.157)  
 Indonesia -0.165* -0.069 -0.725** -0.399 0.043 
   (0.161)   (0.219)   (0.206)   (0.445)   (0.124)  
 Thailand -0.117* -0.257** -0.023 -0.149 0.037 
   (0.062)   (0.110)   (0.100)   (0.246)   (0.073)  
 Vietnam 0.096 0.019 0.130 0.886 0.178 
     (0.303)   (0.449)   (0.399)   (0.934)   (0.273)  
3. Year China -0.219 0.410 0.471 1.288* 0.158 
   (0.466)   (0.637)   (0.595)   (1.241)   (0.343)  
 Malaysia -0.231* -0.007 0.119 -0.279 -0.179* 
   (0.202)   (0.303)   (0.240)   (0.494)   (0.152)  
 Indonesia -0.037 0.014 -0.246 0.243 -0.049 
   (0.165)   (0.215)   (0.270)   (0.469)   (0.153)  
 Thailand 0.020 -0.037 0.020 -0.246* -0.120* 
   (0.071)   (0.093)   (0.105)   (0.171)   (0.069)  
 Vietnam -0.017 -0.008 0.091 0.728 0.428* 
     (0.268)   (0.427)   (0.368)   (0.756)   (0.253)  
Long run China 0.550** -0.037 0.684** 0.644** 0.516** 
   (0.190)   (0.128)   (0.173)   (0.264)   (0.114)  
 Malaysia -0.353** 0.524** -0.213** -0.329** -0.191** 
   (0.114)   (0.079)   (0.104)   (0.159)   (0.068)  
 Indonesia 0.380** 0.357** 0.661** -0.042 -0.007 
   (0.143)   (0.099)   (0.131)   (0.200)   (0.081)  
 Thailand -0.149** -0.057* 0.003 0.601** -0.071* 
   (0.063)   (0.045)   (0.060)   (0.089)   (0.038)  
 Vietnam -0.033 0.186** -0.193* -0.243* 0.403** 
     (0.111)   (0.089)   (0.112)   (0.171)   (0.075)  
Memo item Rest of Asia -0.425 -0.806 -1.116 -0.849 -0.286 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** Denotes a response exceeding two standard errors. * Denotes a response ex-
ceeding one standard error. 
 
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 




















Total FDI flows to Asia (curr. bill. USD)
Total FDI flows to Asia deflated by World cosumer price index (1995=1)
Total FDI flows to Asia deflated by East Asia cosumer price index (1995=1)
Are FDI Inflows Complements or Substitutes Across Borders?: 
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